A few days ago while scanning Arts and Letters Daily I came across Christine Rosen’s essay, “The Image Culture,” published in the Fall 2005 issue of The New Atlantis, self-described as a “journal of technology and society.” Rosen, a senior editor for the publication and fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, makes a smart if familiar case for why we should be concerned about images in contemporary American society: photographs and moving images saturate our culture and circulate at ever-increasing speeds, making it hard to stop and assess their impact on us. Along the way, Rosen offers a standard recitation of the problems posed by these features of “image culture.” She peppers her essay with the requisite quotations of Susan Sontag and Marshall McLuhan, offers summaries of recent diatribes against the evils of PowerPoint, and even muses about the results of neuroscientific studies suggesting that young ferrets forced to watch The Matrix showed different responses to visual stimuli than did older ferrets (I’m not kidding; see page 42).
What’s problematic about the essay, and what makes me so excited to teach it (because teaching smart but problematic essays is fun), is that it’s utterly unreflective about its foundational assumptions. Rosen is aware that anxiety about images has been a theme of our cultural conversation for centuries (though she does not cite one of my favorite iconoclasts, Plato). Yet she doesn’t challenge the fundamental and flawed distinction between “reason” and “emotion” that grounds most arguments about the “danger” of images. Consider the following statements:
“And images appeal to emotion—often viscerally so. They claim our attention without uttering a word. They can persuade, repel, or charm us. They can be absorbed instantly and easily by anyone who can see. They seem to speak for themselves” (28).
“Or are we merely making a peculiar and unwelcome return to forms of communication once ascendant in the preliterate societies . . . and in the process becoming, as the late Daniel Boorstin argued, slavishly devoted to the enchanting and superficial image at the expense of the deeper truths that the written word alone can convey?” (29)
An important but missing premise hovering over each of these examples is the assumption that the printed word or text is the opposite of the image and therefore superior. What “picture” of images does Rosen give us here? Look again at the examples above. Images are visceral. They appeal to emotions. They persuade. They are “absorbed” (interesting word) “instantly” and “easily” by “anyone who can see.” Images require no thought, no reason, no special expertise or education. Why, even the “preliterate” can easily understand them and become (echoes of Plato here), “slavishly devoted” to their enchanting yet superficial qualities. (My readers who study the history of rhetoric are perking up right about now, for this is, not coincidentally, also the familiar critique of rhetoric as the “harlot of the arts”). Images are too easy, too emotional, too democratic. A culture of text or the printed word, by contrast, is difficult. It fosters thought, reason and "deeper truth" and requires educated experts and elites.
The word good/image bad argument is a major player in conversations among scholars and politicians regarding communication and politics. The question goes something like this: If "the people" are supposed to deliberate to help leaders make good choices, how can this happen in a culture that seems to privilege "emotion" over "reason"? We'll be talking a lot about this question (and the communication norms it assumes) in my graduate seminar this semester. I will have more to say about Rosen's essay at some point (if you're even interested), but for now I'll leave it that I think Rosen’s essay is a classic example of the ways that iconophobia, or fear of images, gets mobilized into conversations about “what’s wrong” with the public sphere.